
Battle Simulations

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On today's battlefield, the continuous wave of new technology and the rapid exchange of digitized information demand the highest level of command and control. Commanders need to fine-tune their staffs and train their individual units to a high state of readiness in applying these information age tools.

With the scarcity of funds, commanders have to find alternate methods of training their units. When a unit goes to the field, the commander has to feel confident that his soldiers will gain the maximum benefit from the training event. His staff must understand what needs to be accomplished so the individual soldier's time is not wasted.

Battle simulations are a low-cost, safe, and effective way of training commanders, staffs, and individual subordinate units. Using the crawl-walk-run method of training, units are given an opportunity to increase their readiness. Although nothing can substitute for live rounds down range and actually fighting on a piece of terrain, such exercises can be supplemented by low-cost simulations during the unit's training cycle.

Some of the simulations in the military inventory are individual-skill simulations, such as flight simulators, and more complex systems that integrate a variety of military components, such as a joint theater level simulation.

The accessibility of simulations makes scheduling fairly easy for units of brigade size and smaller. Most major installations have battle simulation centers, which seek out units to fill simulation slots. Most of these centers are up-to-date on the new simulations being developed and placed in the inventory on a regular basis.

To train a unit properly, a commander

must understand its strengths and weaknesses. If a unit expends all its energy and resources during a rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) in training the maneuver units while placing little emphasis on the combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units, it will fall short of defeating the opposing force. It is important that the commander train all of his units and assets as he would have them fight in combat. A commander can develop a simulation program that will train all of his subordinate units while retaining complete control of the training environment.

The commander also needs to identify the simulation that best meets his units' training goals and objectives. He can outline his concept and training goals to the instructors at the battle simulation center and allow them to guide him to the simulation that will be most productive.

Two major simulations in the inventory can be used effectively to train units, from brigade level down to squad level. The first is the Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation (BBS), which is a primary command and staff trainer. It focuses on giving commanders and their staffs a real-time, free-play exercise that stresses the staff to react to simulation play. The second is JANUS, an analytical tactical trainer. It focuses chiefly on company-size units but can be used at battalion or brigade as well. It verifies tactical orders and stresses all battlefield operating systems.

Major goals of these systems are to give commanders and staffs an opportunity to do the following:

- Prepare to execute mission training plans (MTP).
- Exercise and evaluate internal staff

training and standing operating procedures.

- Develop awareness of the lethality and complexity of the battlefield.
- Evaluate written material and verbal communication processes between commanders and staffs.
- Provide a dynamic situation that requires changing courses of action and issuing fragmentary orders.

The systems have the following capabilities:

- Permits operations on terrain (NTC, JRTC, Haiti) that allows for a full maneuver box without common training area restrictions.
- Allows the commander to direct the exercise.
- Allows for hard-copy feedback from the computer system to assist in the after-action review process.
- Moves equipment and personnel in real time.
- Trains all types of units (maneuver, CS, and CSS).
- Exercises doctrinal command and control relationships.
- Realistically drives battlefield operating systems.
- Replicates the communication environment as closely as possible to unit doctrine and standing operating procedures.
- Lets units conduct single or multi-echelon exercises either on station or at a remote site.

These simulations have some limitations: They do not simulate human factors such as sleep and morale; the exercise of some CS and CSS factors is degraded because of inherent complexities; and play boxes are limited to brigade-size units.

A simulation work-up can be imple-

mented on most military installations. The quality of the simulation will depend on the amount of time the unit spends in planning the simulation, as well as on the experience of the personnel actually conducting the simulation.

A simulation work-up may look like the following:

- Brigade alone: BBS staff planning command post exercise (CPX), two or three days.

- Brigade and battalions: BBS staff planning CPX, two or three days.

- Individual battalion: BBS staff planning CPX, two or three days.

- Individual battalion: one-day JANUS tactical/battlefield operating system synchronization exercise.

- Individual company: JANUS exercise with the commander and S-3 observing and assessing unit training needs, two or three days. (The program should take place over a period of 18 to 24 months for active duty units, and may take longer for Reserve and National Guard units.)

If properly identified, simulations can

complement any training program a unit develops. They give a commander an opportunity to train as a brigade staff without the usual distractions and restrictions.

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Firearms Training System: A Proposal for Future ROE Training

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The proper use of force is critical in a peacekeeping operation but the improper use of force to attain a short-term tactical success can lead to a long-term strategic failure. More and more military operations in the future will require U.S. forces to apply varying degrees of force, ranging from the individual decision of a soldier to pull the trigger to a company level response.

From peace operations to traditional force-on-force engagements, the operational tempo and rules of engagement (ROEs) can change quickly, and our forces need to prepare for this challenge. A significant part of their training needs to be focused on the use of force and ROEs for individual responses.

Changing political realities now place U.S. forces in situations that are more familiar to civilian law enforcement officers than to traditional warfighters, as soldiers find themselves in situations that require a more discriminating use of force. Even traditional force-on-force

conflicts, post-combat operations, and nation-building missions will require our soldiers to operate in environments with ROEs something less than those that apply to combat.

The Army's current use-of-force and ROE training can be improved to prepare soldiers for these new missions. The greatest void is in the development and

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implementation of a practical hands-on firearms training device for individual soldiers preparing for peacekeeping missions.

I propose that the Army adopt an interactive computer simulation firearms training device such as the one the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) already

employs in use-of-force training for its agents. Before analyzing the applicability of the FBI's device for military use, however, it is essential to understand the similarities between civilian law and policy and military ROEs. Civil law and policy require the "reasonable" use of force against imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. Most modern military ROEs embrace the concept of the reasonable use of force with language concerning "hostile acts" and "hostile intent."

"Reasonableness," as demonstrated by case law, allows for a more forceful response than many would expect. This same standard of reasonableness applies to decisions on the use of deadly force in most military operations. Mission parameters, however, often complicate the application of a reasonable response. Unlike pre-planned attacks, raids, or ambushes, most peace missions do not clearly identify a "hostile force" before engagement. Therefore, the reasonable-